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THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A
GUIDELINE TO REMEDY OHIO’S SENTENCING
DISPARITIES FOR WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS
JOELLE LIVORSE*
ABSTRACT
Over the past few decades, white-collar crimes have significantly increased across
the country, especially in Ohio. However, Ohio’s judges are ill-equipped to handle the
influx of cases. Unlike federal judges who are guided by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Ohio’s judges have significantly more
sentencing discretion because the Ohio legislature provides minimal guidance for
these crimes. As a result, Ohio’s white-collar criminal defendants are experiencing
dramatic sentencing variations. To solve this problem, Ohio should look to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and neighboring states to adopt and create an innovative
sentencing model tailored to white-collar crime. Unlike the federal system, Ohio fails
to utilize a matrix style grid—which provides notice and uniformity in sentencing. In
addition, Ohio should adopt the Federal Sentencing Guideline’s loss threshold
amounts for white-collar crimes because the ranges in Ohio are too wide and, thereby,
impose a longer sentence. The smaller ranges used by the federal government helps
reduce prison terms while providing notice and uniformity to judges, practitioners,
defendants, and the public. Pennsylvania, Ohio’s neighboring state, also created
unique and tailored sentencing matrices for specific criminal conduct. A tailored
sentencing matrix that focuses on white-collar crime would better adapt the sentence
to the criminal defendant’s wrongdoing. Although the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
have been criticized, they offer visible and uniform benefits that Ohio severely lacks
for white-collar criminal defendants. If Ohio turns a blind eye to these sentencing
disparities, a white-collar criminal defendant’s sentence is left to the mercy of a system
with unfettered judicial discretion and arbitrary sentences.
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I. INTRODUCTION: OHIO’S SENTENCING DISPARITY FOR WHITE-COLLAR
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
What if a defendant’s conduct did not determine his prison sentence, but instead
the sentence depended on a decision to prosecute the defendant at the state or federal
level? In fact, criminal defendants in Ohio are experiencing this problem today—
particularly white-collar criminal defendants. Ohio’s lack of an understandable and
comprehensive felony sentencing model for white-collar criminal defendants results
in dramatic sentencing variations.1 For example, bribery of a public official in Ohio is
a felony of the third degree and imposes a sentence of nine to thirty-six months in
prison.2 Yet in the federal court system, bribery of a public official, also a felony,
imposes a sentence of zero to six months in prison.3 For a defendant with no criminal
history, this is a sizeable difference of nine months to three years in state prison,
compared to a maximum of six months in federal prison. Accordingly, Ohio should

1

See generally Derick R. Vollrath, Losing the Loss Calculation: Toward a More Just
Sentencing Regime in White-Collar Criminal Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1001, 1005 (2010). The
United States Sentencing Guidelines “were developed to remedy the prevalence of unwarranted
sentencing disparity.”
2

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2921.02, 2929.14 (West 2018).

3

See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 2 (2018); compare United
States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 5 (2018).
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adopt a sentencing model similar to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to reduce
judicial discretion4 and unpredictability in Ohio’s criminal justice system.
State court judges in Ohio have significantly more autonomy than federal judges
when sentencing white-collar criminal defendants. While Ohio judges do rely upon a
Felony Reference Sheet,5 there are no official guidelines, like in the federal system,
that mandate certain punishment (or ranges of punishment) for certain criminal
conduct.6 When sentencing a defendant for a felony, Ohio judicial discretion is
tethered only to the state law’s overarching purpose. This purpose is to punish the
offender and protect the public while “using the minimum sanctions . . . without
imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources.” 7 The Ohio
Revised Code (hereinafter “the Code”) provides for minimum sanctions, but each
felony has a wide range of sentencing provisions.8 While the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines are by no means a perfect standard, they are important to provide notice to
a criminal defendant and constrain a defendant’s sentence. Additionally, Ohio should
follow other states, such as Pennsylvania, which uses matrices that could benefit Ohio
because a defendant’s punishment is tailored to their specific criminal conduct. 9 This
approach reduces arbitrary sentences for defendants that commit both felony and
misdemeanor offenses.10
The Principle of Legality is a pillar of American criminal law, meaning “no crime
without law, no punishment without law.”11 With the current sentencing model in
place, Ohio falls short of upholding this fundamental pillar. There are three interrelated
corollaries to the legality principle.12 First, criminal statutes should be understandable
to a reasonable, law-abiding person.13 Second, criminal statutes should be drafted as
to not delegate basic policy matters.14 Third, ambiguous statutes should “be biased in
4 James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 179–80 (2010).
5

Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission, Felony Sentencing-Quick Reference Guide (May
2017). This Felony Reference Sheet includes crimes such as murder, sexual offenses, drug
crimes, and human trafficking. However, there are no specific references to white-collar crimes.
6

See KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY & JENNIFER TAUB, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME 694
(2017). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines take a tough stance on white-collar criminals. The
philosophy is that the system can best achieve deterrence by requiring short, but definite prison
terms.
7

O.R.C. § 2929.11.

8

Id. § 2929.14. The statute provides for definite prison terms, for example a felony of the
first degree imposes a prison term of three to eleven years. A felony in the second degree
imposes a prison terms of two to eight years, while a felony of the third degree imposes a
prison terms of thirty-six months to twelve years, depending on the crime.
9

See discussion infra Section III.B.

10

Id.

11 JOSHUA
12

Id.

13

Id.

DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 92 (2012).

14 Id.; see also Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and The Intangible Rights Doctrine:
Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 191–92 (1994). The federal mail fraud
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favor of the accused,” also known as the Lenity Doctrine.15 Focusing on the first
corollary, the punishment for committing a crime should be clear to citizens. However,
Ohio criminal statutes that impose felonies for white-collar offenses permit
substantially more judicial discretion when sentencing defendants that commit whitecollar crimes than Congress allows federal judges.
This Note examines the disparity between the sentencing of white-collar
defendants at the Ohio state court level and at the federal level. Because of Ohio’s lack
of an understandable and constricted sentencing model,16 the length of a defendant’s
prison sentence is left at the mercy of the decision to prosecute the defendant at the
state or national level. This Note proceeds in four parts. Part II provides background
information about white-collar crimes and why society punishes these offenses. This
section also examines historical and modern criminal sentencing in the United States
and Ohio. Part III identifies various aspects of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
Pennsylvania’s sentencing model that Ohio should adopt and implement. This section
also proposes a clear and uniform model for sentencing white-collar criminal
defendants in Ohio. Additionally, Part III also describes the alleged flaws of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and identifies how these “flaws” are actually beneficial
to the federal government and Ohio. Finally, Part IV briefly concludes.

II. THE IMPORTANCE OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMES AND HISTORY OF
SENTENCING IN THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO
A. What Are White-Collar Crimes and Why Do We Punish Them?
The term “white-collar crime” has expanded and evolved over time.17 Today, the
public understands white-collar crimes as wrongful acts by one or more trusted
individuals or corporations that abuse their power and purposely or inadvertently
injure another individual, corporation, or government agency.18 For example, whitestatute is a broad and overarching criminal statute that easily attaches to white-collar offenses
to bring the claim within the jurisdiction of federal courts. Ms. Moohr argues that the federal
mail fraud statute is unconstitutionally vague. Hence, the federal statute violates due process
by “placing ‘unfettered discretion’ in the hands of police, thereby permitting or even
encouraging arbitrary, discriminatory enforcement.” Id. at 192.
15

DRESSLER, supra note 11, at 92. John Hasnas, Ethics and The Problem of White Collar
Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 579, 662 (2005) (“The substantive protections provided by the ban
on vicarious criminal liability, the mens rea requirement, and principle of legality clearly had
to be abandoned or relaxed if the statutes against white collar crime were to be enforced.”).
16

See David J. Diroll, A Decade of Sentencing Reform, A Sentencing Commission Staff
Report 13 (Mar. 2007). Simplification of Ohio’s sentencing code would make it easier and
more understandable to practitioners and citizens.
17 See Lucian E. Dervan & Ellen S. Podgor, “White-Collar Crime”: Still Hazy After All
These Years, 50 GA. L. REV. 709, 712 (2016).
18

See Hendrik Schneider, The Corporation as Victim of White Collar Crime: Results from a
Study of German Public and Private Companies, 22 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 171, 173
(2015). Dr. Schneider provides a widely accepted definition of white-collar crimes. He
describes white-collar crime as “illegal or unethical acts that violate fiduciary responsibility of
public trust committed by an individual or organization, usually during the course of legitimate
occupational activity, by persons of high or respectable social status for personal or organization
gain.” Id. However, there many other definitions of white-collar crime. See, e.g., White-Collar
Crime, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/white-collar-crime (last visited Sept. 10. 2019)
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collar crimes include insider trading, embezzlement, bribery, racketeering, and more.
In addition, access to the media and technology helped the public comprehend and
mold the image of white-collar offenses.19 Over the past few decades, white-collar
crimes, also known as economic crimes in Ohio, have significantly increased. 20 For
example, in 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation created a task force to handle
the Enron scandal which was “the most complex white-collar criminal investigation
in its history.”21 Not only are economic crimes dangerous on a national level,22 but
these crimes also pose a major threat in Ohio.23 In 2015, the economic crime rate in
Ohio was 17.3% higher than the violent crime rate.24 Because of the rise in whitecollar offenses, Congress implemented new policies and reforms.25 An essential
(“These [white-collar] crimes are characterized by deceit, concealment, or violation of trust and
are not dependent on the application or threat of physical force or violence. The motivation
behind these crimes is financial—to obtain or avoid losing money, property, or services or to
secure a personal or business advantage.”).
19 Many multimillion-dollar blockbusters are based on real and infamous white-collar offenses

and their perpetrators. For example, The Wolf of Wall Street recounts Jordan Belfort’s
fraudulent career as a “successful” stockbroker on Wall Street. Belfort engaged in a series of
corrupt activities that caused him to plead guilty to an array of crimes related to a penny-stock
scam. However, even though Belfort scammed innocent Americans of millions of dollars, he
only spent twenty-two months in prison. WOLF OF WALL STREET (Paramount Pictures 2013);
see INSIDE JOB (Sony Pictures Classic 2010); Madoff (Amazon 2016); White Collar (USA
Network 2014). See generally Geraldine Szott Moohr, White Collar Movies and Why They
Matter, 16 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 119 (2015).
20 See Stephen Labaton, Downturn and Shift in Population Feed Boom in White-Collar Crime,
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2002, at A1, 29.
21 See Enron, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/enron (last visited Sept. 10,
2019). Public investors, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and Enron’s own
board of directors had no idea that Enron’s reported financial statements were “grossly
inaccurate.” John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s
Perspective, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 57, 71 (2005). These inaccuracies were so misleading that
Enron disguised a $622 million loss as $2.4 billion in profit. Id. at 73. Consequently, Congress
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to help avoid another Enron catastrophe. See infra note 25 &
26.
22 According to the United States Sentencing Commission’s most recent study, 10% of the
federal court’s caseload stems from the economic crime guidelines in Section 2B1.1. Courtney
Semisch, What Does Federal Economic Crime Really Look Like?, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2
(2019). Section 2B1.1 is one of the five most frequently applied guidelines in federal sentencing.
Id. at 3.
23

Jimmy Dimora, the former Cuyahoga County Commissioner, was convicted of
racketeering and thirty-two bribery and corruption charges. Rachel Dissell, Jimmy Dimora
Sentenced to 28 Years in Prison, Defense Attorney Calls it a ‘Death Sentence’,
CLEVELAND.COM
(July
31,
2012),
https://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2012/07/jimmy_dimora_sentenced_to.html.
24

Alan Wedd, Economic Crime in Ohio Report 2015, OHIO DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY 9 (2015).

25See

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 107 Stat. 745 (2002) [hereinafter
Sarbanes-Oxley Act]. On July 30, 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to
establish tighter regulations on the security industry and to protect investors. The SarbanesOxley Act enhanced white-collar crime penalties. Specifically, § 905 directed the U.S.
Sentencing Commission to review the two aspects of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
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reason the government penalizes these offenders is the high cost imposed on thousands
of innocent Americans due to the wrongful actions of one individual or corporate
entity.26 These financial losses can significantly impact, or even destroy, the financial
livelihood of innocent citizens and shareholders through their pensions, retirement
plans, and, indirectly, through the economy.27 Therefore, the punishment of whitecollar crime is necessary to advance the welfare of the public, sustain the national
economy, and protect the wealth of innocent Americans. 28

verify that the punishment supports the offender’s conduct. First, the Commission must ensure
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines “reflect the serious nature of the offense . . . the growing
incidence of serious fraud offenses, and the need to deter and punish such offenses.” Second,
the Commission must consider “whether a specific offense characteristic should be added in
order to provide stronger penalties for fraud committed by a corporate officer or director.” Id.
In addition, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act to regulate the financial industry, particularly those on Wall Street. See 12 U.S.C. § 53
(2018).
26 Wilson Meeks, Corporate and White-Collar Crime Enforcement: Should Regulation and
Rehabilitation Spell an End to Corporate Criminal Liability?, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
77, 78 (2006). See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former CEO of Arthrocare
Corporation Convicted for Orchestrating $750 Million Securities Fraud Scheme (Aug. 18,
2017) (convicting former CEO of a securities scheme that defrauded shareholders of more than
$750 million.); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Volkswagen AG Agrees to Plead Guilty
and Pay $4.3 Billion in Criminal and Civil Penalties; Six Volkswagen Executives and
Employees are Indicted in Connection with Conspiracy to Cheat U.S. Emissions Tests (May 3,
2018) (pleading guilty to three felony counts and fined $2.8 billion in criminal penalties as a
result of a long-term scheme to defraud the revenue of the United States and lying and
obstructing justice to further the scheme.); see also Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi Scheme
Exposes “The Myth of the Sophisticated Investor”, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 215, 219–20 (2010).
Bernie Madoff defrauded investors of an estimated $64.8 billion that impacted “hedge fund
managers, charities, pension funds, retirees, celebrities, and self-described ‘average
Americans.’” See also Elizabeth Cosenza, Rethinking Attorney Liability Under Rule 10B-5 In
Light of the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Tellabs and Stoneridge, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1,
3–4 (2008). At the turn of the 21st century, the Enron Corporation was the seventh-largest
company in the United States, employed about 21,000 people, had $60 billion in assets, and had
an annual income of more than $100 billion. Yet, Enron collapsed as a result of numerous illegal
corporate schemes and left investors suffering losses of more than $40 billon. Between 2002
and 2007, more than 200 CEOs, 50 CFOs, and 120 Vice-Presidents were convicted of whitecollar crimes at the federal level. EUGENE SOLTES, WHY THEY DO IT: INSIDE THE MIND OF THE
WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINAL 41 (2016).
27 “While violent crimes may well provoke widespread community outrage more readily than
crimes involving monetary loss, economic crimes are certainly capable of rousing public
passions, particularly when thousands of unsuspecting people are robbed of their livelihoods
and retirement savings.” Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 449 (2010); see also Meeks,
supra note 26, at 88. If a company is charged with participating or orchestrating in a crime, the
fines may be shifted to shareholders and consumers in the economy. A corporation can raise its
prices to help offset the egregious fines imposed, which ultimately harm consumers and the
economy by inflating prices. Id.
28 White-collar crimes are more significant than street crimes from a purely economic
perspective and often have the capacity to weaken trust and faith in the basic institutions of
society. STANTON WHEELER, SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR
CRIMINALS 2–3 (1988).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss2/9

6

298

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[68:292

B. History of Sentencing in the United States
To understand and appreciate sentencing in the United States, we must first
examine the origins of our legal system. Old English common law has greatly
influenced American jurisprudence. Throughout the eighteenth century, English
judges had to determine the punishment for an individual’s crime without any
standards to help decide a defendant’s punishment.29 Consequently, judges imposed
severe penalties and sentences for a wide array of crimes.30 The realization of the need
for reform grew and spread across Europe,31 but many resisted this philosophy.32
Ultimately, the ideology of sentencing reform spread to and influenced the American
colonies.
In the early colonial period, the primary sentences for offenders were isolation
and punishment.33 An individual that committed a white-collar crime was fined and
forced to pay restitution.34 Before the American Civil War, many courts abandoned
their “traditional” mechanisms and began to incarcerate criminal defendants. 35
Following this ideology, Dr. Benjamin Rush, a signer of the Declaration of
Independence, delivered an influential speech at the home of Benjamin Franklin in
1787 regarding the establishment of a prison system in the United States. 36 Rush’s
29 SANDRA SHANE-DUBOW ET AL., SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY,
CONTENT, AND EFFECT 1 (1985).
30

Id. The judges sentenced individuals that committed violent felonies, such as murder, and
treason to death. Yet, minor crimes, such as petty theft or cutting a tree from another’s property,
were also punished as capital crimes. During this period, the English criminal code contained
more than two hundred capital crimes.
31

Id. In 1764, Cesare Beccaria––considered one of the greatest thinkers of the Age of
Enlightenment––published On Crimes and Punishment. See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES
AND PUNISHMENT 113 (1764). Beccaria demanded that “punishment should not be an act of
violence perpetrated by one or many upon a private citizen, it is essential that it should be
public, speedy, necessary, the minimum possible in the given circumstances, proportionate to
the crime, and determined by the law.”
32

SHANE-DUBOW ET AL., supra note 29, at 2. In 1765, the Roman Catholic Church
denounced Beccaria as a heretic and “socialist.” The following year, the Church categorized
On Crimes and Punishments as a condemned book. Even, philosopher Immanuel Kant
disagreed with Beccaria’s demand to end capital punishment. Kant argued that “society must
impose capital punishment in order to maintain a system based upon the individual’s inherent
worth as an individual and his right to receive punishment . . . .”
33

Alan M. Dershowitz, Criminal Sentencing in the United States: An Historical and
Conceptual Overview, 423 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACADEMY OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 117, 118
(1976) “Colonial Americans used a variety of nonincarcerative techniques to protect their
communities from the threat of crime.” Id. at 124.
Id. “Offenders who simply could not pay were sentenced to forced labor, whipped, placed
in the stocks or branded with a symbol of their offense.” Id. at 124–25.
34

35 Id. at 125. These jurisdictions abandoned “flogging, whipping, branding, and other
corporal punishments.”
36 Id. Dr. Rush envisioned a prison system that would “(1) establish various inmates
“classification” programs, for purpose of both inmate housing assignments and various
“treatment” plans; (2) devise a self-supporting institutional system based on inmate piecework
and agriculture; and (3) impose indeterminate periods of confinement on inmates who would
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belief in an isolated prison system, rather than public punishments, spread and evolved
across the country. Society soon began to understand the functionality of the prison
system and major reforms of sentencing power were implemented across the
country.37 Consequently, legislatures proposed ranges for criminal offenses, but
judges retained the ultimate power to determine a defendant’s sentence.38 As a result,
white-collar criminal defendants received inconsistent sentences before the
implementation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.39

C. Modern Sentencing in the United States
By the 1980s, it became clear that the United States had to solve its sentencing
disparity problem, especially for white-collar criminal defendants.40 Congress passed
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which established and required the U.S.
Sentencing Commission to create a set of guidelines to assist federal judges when
sentencing criminal defendants.41 The U.S. Sentencing Commission also revised
then be released on the basis of evidence of their progress towards “rehabilitation.” Beccaria’s
On Crimes and Punishment may have influenced Dr. Rush’s ideology. DAVID FREEMAN
HAWKE, BENJAMIN RUSH: REVOLUTIONARY GADFLY 364 (1971).
37 Dershowitz, supra note 33, at 128. By 1922, thirty-seven states established indeterminate
sentencing models and seven states had similar parole systems.
38 Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law,
or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 696 (2010).
39

See United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (sentencing
defendant who stole more than $1,000,000 to four months in prison); United States v.
Browder, 398 F. Supp. 1042, 1043, 1047 (D. Or. 1975) (sentencing defendant who stole
$500,000 to twenty-five years in prison). These two cases demonstrate the exact problem
courts across the country faced—two federal district courts sentenced two defendants that
committed similar white-collar offenses to vastly different sentence terms because of the lack
of a uniform sentencing model. See also Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79
VA. L. REV. 741, n.44 (1993).
40 “We are all aware of the great variation in sentencing practices . . . . It must be ranked as
one of our foremost problems in the administration of justice . . . . Terms for forgery range
from nine months in Maine and the Southern District of New York to sixty-three months in
Oklahoma and fifty-eight months in Western Arkansas.” Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy, Address at Joint Sentencing Institute of the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Judicial
Circuits (Oct. 12, 1961). The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 became a solution.
Congress enacted The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 for two purposes: honesty in
sentencing and the reduction of unjustifiable sentence disparities. See Justice Stephen Breyer,
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) (“Honesty in sentencing” refers to the offender serving the
imposed sentence from the judge, excluding “good time.”).
41 Breyer, supra note 40, at 5. The U.S. Sentencing Commission includes seven members—
three of which are federal judges, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
Currently, five of the seven voting positions, including the Chair, are vacant on the U.S.
Sentencing Commission. The two Commissioners are Judge Charles R. Breyer (Northern
District of California) and Judge Danny C. Reves (Eastern District of Kentucky). Four
affirmative votes are required to amend the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, but there are only two
voting members on the Commission. Hence, zero changes can occur to the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines. Organization, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, https://www.ussc.gov/about/whowe-are/organization (last visited Sept. 2, 2019). Many believe these vacancies are due to
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federal probation laws to provide judges with a wider range of sentencing options, and
considerably abolished parole in the federal system. 42
Today, the U.S. Sentencing Commission43 is responsible for establishing policies
and practices for sentencing in the federal criminal justice system.44 More specifically,
the U.S. Sentencing Commission provides a range of guidelines for a specific offense
and class of offender.45 In federal court, the judge normally determines the offender’s
sentence within the range of the guidelines, but may stray from the suggested range
under specific circumstances.46
The best method to understand the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is to examine
the seven steps that federal judges use when sentencing white-collar criminal
defendants.47 The first step is to calculate the base offense level, which can be
determined from the guidelines manual and the forty-three level offense table
promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.48 In step two, the judge examines
specific offense characteristics of that particular crime to determine the gravity of the
crime.49 Steps three and four allow the judge to adjust the offense level if deemed
President Trump’s lack of appointing individuals for the Commission or the Senate failing to
confirm his nominees, such as William Otis.
42

BRICKEY & TAUB, supra note 6, at 694. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 also raised
fines for offenses.
43 See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2018). This statue provides a duty of the U.S. Sentencing Commission
to create guidelines for punishing criminal defendants in the federal court system.
44 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 1A, intro, comment. 1 (2016).
45 Id. § 2. However, the offense range must be narrow: the maximum cannot exceed the
minimum by more than 25% of 6 months.
46 Id. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005) (holding that the provision of the

Federal Sentencing Act that made the guidelines mandatory and set forth a standard of review
would be severed to maintain the validity of the Act.). The Court noted that “[t]hese features of
the remaining system . . . continue to move sentencing in Congress’ preferred direction, helping
to avoid excessive sentencing disparities while maintaining flexibility sufficient to individualize
sentences where necessary.” Id. at 264–65. Therefore, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are
not mandatory, but rather an important advisory to federal judges when sentencing criminal
defendants. See also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (explaining that “a district
court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable
Guidelines range.”); see infra note 50.
47

BRICKEY & TAUB, supra note 6, at 695.

48 Id. The purpose of step one is to rank the severity of the offenses. See USSG § 1A2.2
(“[The] advisory guideline system continues to assure transparency by requiring that
sentences be based on articulated reasons stated in open court that are subject to appellate
review.”).
49 BRICKEY & TAUB, supra note 6, at 696. For example, the Guidelines provide that the
crime of fraud is a level 6 offense. However, the magnitude of the crime can increase
depending on the estimated or probable loss from the committed fraud. If the loss is $5,000
or less, the crime remains a level 6 offense; but if the loss is higher the offense level can
increase 1 to 18 levels. These increases can significantly impact a judge’s decision to sentence
the criminal defendant to a longer prison sentence. Id. For example, when the loss in mail
fraud is more than $70,000–rather than $10,000–the recommended sentence doubles. Gwin,
supra note 4, at 181.
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appropriate and if the defendant is convicted of multiple counts.50 Step five, an
important and unique aspect of the federal sentencing system, allows a two level
decrease in the base offense level if the defendant “clearly demonstrates acceptance
of personal responsibility for his offense.” 51 Step six allows the judge to consider a
defendant’s prior criminal history.52 Finally, in the last step, the court utilizes the
sentencing table53 to determine where the criminal defendant’s conduct lies and
imposes a sentence within the designated range.54

D. Ohio’s Sentencing Structure
In 1974, the Ohio General Assembly “completely revised” its legal system and
ratified uniform sentencing for all crimes.55 Initially, Ohio’s revised sentencing
structure for felonies included first, second, third, and fourth degree felony categories
with large sentencing disparities between the categories.56 Ultimately, this structure
50 BRICKEY & TAUB, supra note 6, at 696. A judge can adjust the offense level from a variety
of factors, such as an unusually vulnerable victim, defendant’s role in the offense (whether
aggravating or mitigating), or obstruction of justice. Additionally, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines stipulate “procedures for grouping closely related counts, for determining the
offense level applicable to each group of counts, and for determining the combined offense
level.”
51 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 3E (2018). There are
numerous considerations that are relevant in determining whether the defendant qualifies for
the two level decrease. For example, “truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the
offense(s) of conviction, and truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional
relevant conduct for which the defendant is accountable under §1B1.3 . . . . [V]oluntary
termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations; voluntary payment of
restitution prior to adjudication of guilt; voluntary surrender to authorities promptly after
commission of the offense; voluntary assistance to authorities in the recovery of the fruit and
instrumentalities of the offense; voluntary resignation from the offense or position held during
the commission of the offense; post-offense rehabilitative efforts; and the timeliness of the
defendant’s conduct in manifesting the acceptance of responsibility.”
52 BRICKEY & TAUB, supra note 6, at 697. This step allows the court to consider the number
and seriousness of a defendant’s prior offenses. Thus, step six does not affect first-time
offenders.
53 Id. at 698. The sentencing table is a grid containing vertical and horizontal columns. The
vertical column ranks offenses by their severity; a level one offense is the least severe while a
level forty-three represents the most severe offense level. The horizontal column increases
severity depending on the criminal defendant’s prior criminal history.
54

Id.

SHANE-DUBOW ET AL., supra note 29, at 213. Ohio’s statutes provided certain criteria
Judges were required to consider to impose a defendant’s sentence; including (1) the nature and
circumstances of the offense, (2) the history, character, and condition of the offender, (3) the
offender’s need for correctional and rehabilitative treatment; and (4) the resources and ability
of the offender to pay fines. See Harry J. Lehman & Alan E. Norris, Some Legislative History
and Comments on Ohio’s New Criminal Code, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 8, 9 (1974) (discussing that
the Technical Committee responsible for drafting the new criminal code relied on revised
criminal codes from Illinois, New York, Wisconsin, and the Model Penal Code of the American
Law Institute).
55

56

See 1972 H 511.
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left a lot for the judge to determine.57 Seven years later, the General Assembly’s
concern for repeat offenders led to the enactment of Senate Bill 199, 58 which created
“aggravated felony” ranges and “repeat aggravated felonies.” 59 Yet, Ohio’s legal
system still encountered problems,60 which led the General Assembly to enact Senate
Bill 2 in 1996.61 Senate Bill 2 reformed felony sentencing in Ohio.62
Today, Ohio is experiencing the same problem the United States had before the
existence of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines—disparity in sentencing white-collar
criminal defendants. Similar to the federal system, the Ohio Criminal Sentencing
Commission is responsible for creating a uniform criminal sentencing code.63 Unlike
the federal system, Ohio does not use a matrix-style grid to guide judges in felony
sentencing.64 Sara Koenig, host of the widely-popular podcast, Serial, spoke perfectly
about Ohio’s current sentencing structure for criminal defendants:
There are sentencing guidelines of course spelled out in
excruciating detail in the Ohio Revised Code and I’d assumed the
guidelines meant that sentencing was fairly mechanical. A certain
kind of charge would produce a certain kind of sentence, plus or
minus a little wiggly room in the margin to account for special
circumstances or whatever else. But it’s not like that. County judges
in Ohio have a lot of leeway in sentencing, a lot of discretion to
interpret what punishment consists of, what danger to the public
looks like. Leeway, discretion, that’s power by another name.65

Ohio’s first attempt at sentencing reform gave state judges immense discretion. For
example, a first degree felony imposed a sentence range of 4 to 25 years; second degree felony
imposed 2 to 15 years; third degree felony imposed 1 to 10 years; and a fourth degree felony
imposed 6 months to 5 years. SHANE-DUBOW ET AL., supra note 29, at 213.
57

58 JOHN WOOLREDGE ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE IMPACT OF OHIO’S SENATE BILL 2
ON SENTENCING DISPARITIES 5 (2002) [hereinafter OHIO SENTENCING WHITE PAPER].
59 Id. The legislation “added eight new prison sentence ranges to the original four ranges from
the 1974 criminal code.”
60

See Diroll, supra note 16, at 11.

61

See S.2, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1996).

62 WOOLREDGE ET AL., supra note 58, at 4. Senate Bill 2 provided key changes, such as
truthing-in-sentencing, a broad continuum of sanctions, expanded the right of victims, and
offered guidance by offense level and appellate review. Before S.B. 2, convicted felons were
administered indeterminate and determinate sentences. For example, an indeterminate sentence,
such as four to twelve years, allowed the Ohio Parole Board to release felons early or hold
them for longer periods. Conversely, determinate sentences require release after the offender
has served a fixed term. Diroll, supra note 16, at 11.
63

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 181.24 (West 2018).

A key characteristic of sentencing in Ohio is the state’s rejection of the grid sentencing
system and presumptive sentencing ranges. Ohio rejected this structure to afford greater
judicial discretion. DAVID DIROLL & SCOTT ANDERSON, OHIO CRIMINAL SENT’G COMM’N,
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING AFTER BLAKELY AND BOOKER 12 (2005).
64

Sara Koenig, You’ve Got Some Gauls, SERIAL (Sept. 21,
https://serialpodcast.org/season-three/2/youve-got-some-gauls (emphasis added).
65
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Currently, Ohio’s criminal penalties are described in lengthy detail in section 2929
of the Code.66 Section 2929.12(B) provides a list of non-exhaustive factors the
sentencing court shall consider to determine if the offender’s conduct is “more serious
than conduct normally constituting the offense.”67 Similarly, section 2929.12(C)
provides various mitigating factors.68 Ohio judges may also consider other factors to
determine if the offender will commit a future crime. 69 The decision to implement
Ohio’s sentencing structure into criminal statutes has caused the system to be
complex70 and difficult to comprehend and apply.71
The Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission suggested a necessary topic for further
study: the simplification of Ohio’s felony sentencing code.72 The Ohio Criminal
Sentencing Commission acknowledged that the sentencing structure “adds untold
hours to the workloads of judges, prosecutors, [and] defense attorneys . . . .” 73
Furthermore, Ohio’s sentencing structure makes it “extremely difficult for offenders,
victims, and the media to understand criminal sentences.”74 It also recognized that
Ohio should “streamline and simplify” section 2929 of the Code to make it easier for

66

See O.R.C. § 2929.14.

Id. These factors include: “(1) [t]he physical or mental injury suffered by the victim of
the offense due to the conduct of the offender was exacerbated because of the physical or
mental condition or age of the victim; (2) [t]he victim of the offense suffered serious physical,
psychological, or economic harm as a result of the offense; (3) [t]he offender held a public
office or position of trust in the community, and the offense related to that office or position;
(4) [t]he offender’s occupation, elected office, or profession obliged the offender to prevent
the offense or bring others committing it to justice; (5) [t]he offender’s professional reputation
or occupation, elected office, or profession was used to facilitate the offense or is likely to
influence the future conduct of others; (6) [t]he offender’s relationship with the victim
facilitated the offense; (7) [t]he offender committed the offense for hire or as part of an
organized criminal activity; [or] (8) [i]n committing the offense, the offender was motivated
by prejudice based on race, ethnic background, gender, sexual orientation or religion . . . .”
Id. § 2929.12 (emphasis added).
67

Id. § 2929.12(C). These factors include, but are not limited to, the following: “(1) [t]he
victim induced or facilitated the offense; (2) [i]n committing the offense, the offender acted
under strong provocation; (3) [i]n committing the offense, the offender did not cause or expect
to cause physical harm to any person or property; [or] (4) [t]here are substantial grounds to
mitigate the offender’s conduct, although the grounds are not enough to constitute a defense.”
68

69 Id. § 2929.12(E). These factors include, but are not limited to: “(1) [p]rior to committing
the offense, the offender has not been adjudicated a delinquent child; (2) [p]rior to committing
the offense, the offender had not been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a criminal offense; (3)
[p]rior to committing the offense, the offender has led a law-abiding life for a significant
number of years; (4) [t]he offense was committed under circumstances not likely to recur; [or]
(5) [t]he offender shows genuine remorse for the offense.”
70 Since Senate Bill 2’s enactment, Ohio’s felony sentencing code has become “remarkably
complex.” Diroll, supra note 16, at 13.
71

Id. The convoluted sentencing structure makes it difficult apply Ohio’s criminal statutes.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

Id.
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citizens and attorneys to understand.75 Therefore, a simple model, similar to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, would foster more consistency in Ohio’s criminal
justice system.76
Not only is Ohio’s sentencing system complex and confusing, but it allows Ohio
judges to retain too much discretion when sentencing criminal defendants.77 For
example, if a defendant pleads guilty to a crime in the federal system, the offender’s
acceptance of responsibility automatically decreases the offense by two levels. 78 But
Ohio is vastly different because this decrease is not automatic; rather, it is the judge’s
decision to consider a guilty plea when sentencing the defendant.79 A report by the
National Center for State Courts supports that Ohio has one of the most voluntary and
discretionary sentencing structures in the United States.80 The report established a
“Sentencing Guideline Continuum” that measures how each state’s sentencing
guidelines affect judicial discretion.81 Ohio received the lowest score possible—a
score of one—on the continuum scale.82 Simply put, Ohio’s “state sentencing
guidelines” provide too much discretion to judges compared to other states in the
nation.83

75

Id.

Id. at 22. A sentencing model that provides “more felony levels with narrower sentence
ranges” could foster more consistency in the legal system.
76

77

WOOLREDGE ET AL., supra note 58, at 11.

78

United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 3E1.1 (2018).

79

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.12(E) (West 2018).

80 NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE SENTENCING

GUIDELINES: PROFILES AND CONTINUUM 5 (2008). The continuum seeks to “compare and
contrast six common characteristics that define and differentiate” sentencing guideline systems
in different states.
Id. The lower the score on the continuum, the more voluntary the state’s sentencing
guidelines. This allows for higher rates of judicial discretion when sentencing criminal
defendants. A higher the score on the continuum means that the state’s sentencing guideline are
more mandatory and, therefore, judges have less discretion. The continuum assigned points to
each state based on its answer to the following six questions: “(1) Is there an enforceable rule
related to guideline use? (2) Is the completion of a worksheet or structured scoring form
required? (3) Does a Sentencing Commission regularly report on guideline compliance? (4)
Are compelling and substantial reasons required for departures? (5) Are written reasons
required for departures? (6) Is there appellate review of defendant-based challenges related to
sentencing guidelines?” Each state is awarded 0, 1 or 2 points based on its answer. North
Carolina was the only state to receive the maximum score of 12.
81

82

Id. at 5. Ohio was only one of two states to score a 1—the other was Wisconsin.

See id. In response to the National Center for State Court’s questions, these were Ohio’s
answers. In response to question (1), Ohio’s guidelines have moved towards an advisory
sentencing system. Following question (2), judges in Ohio are not required to complete
guidelines worksheets. Question (3), there no statistics for Ohio regarding sentencing patterns
or practices. Question (4), Ohio judges may stray from the state’s guidelines, but no
substantial or compelling reason is required. Question (5), no written reasons are required.
Question (6), the sentencing departures are not subject to appeal.
83
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III. OHIO SHOULD ADOPT SIMPLE, CONSISTENT, AND UNPREJUDICIAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
Disparity in sentencing occurs when offenders with comparable prior records
commit similar crimes, but are punished or sentenced differently from each other. 84
Ohio should adopt a sentencing model similar to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to
reduce judicial discretion, unpredictability, and unwarranted sentencing disparities in
Ohio’s criminal justice system.85 In Ohio, the wide-ranging prison terms that judges
rely on are extensively listed in section 2929.14 of the Code.86
Ohio’s sentencing structure creates unwarranted sentencing disparities for whitecollar criminal defendants because offenders that commit similar crimes often receive
vastly different sentences. Yet, scholars across the country discovered that the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines reduced sentencing disparities for criminal defendants.87 The
U.S. Sentencing Commission conducted a survey to support these findings. 88 Thirtytwo percent of federal District Court judges “strongly agreed” that the federal
sentencing guidelines reduced unwarranted sentencing disparities of defendants with
similar prior records.89 Similarly, forty-six percent of federal judges “somewhat
agreed” to this notion.90 Hence, federal judges across the country support the national
structure because the Federal Sentencing Guidelines achieve their purpose.

A. Ohio Should Adopt the Federal System’s Threshold Loss Amounts
A central difference between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Ohio’s
sentencing model is the threshold loss amount required for an increase in the offense
84 Richard S. Frase, Why Have U.S. State and Federal Jurisdictions Enacted Sentencing
Guidelines?, U. OF MINN. (Mar. 25, 2015), https://sentencing.umn.edu/content/why-have-usstate-and-federal-jurisdictions-enacted-sentencing-guidelines.
85 For example, Ohio has failed to track the progress and effectiveness of its sentencing
structure, especially in Cuyahoga County. See Koenig, supra note 65 (stating “[t]his is
possibly the most profound and least examined question in the building: What works? The
court doesn’t gather statistics on sentencing, and that’s true for most of the country by the
way, no data that says defendants in Cuyahoga County do better after 6 months of probation
than after 3 years of probation, or in terms of reoffending, 4 years in prison yields better results
than 7 years in prison. We just don’t know—which I found rather astounding that no one is
tracking this. . . . [B]ut there’s no database locally or nationally, that shows what works.”).
86

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.01 (West 2018); see supra Section II.D.

87

See Lydia Brashear Tiede, The Impact of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Reform:
A Comparative Analysis, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 34 (2009).
88 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY
JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 tbl. 2 (2010).
89

OF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES,

Id. at tbl. 20.

90

Id. Six hundred and twenty-nine federal judges answered this question, while only ten
judges abstained. Only six percent of federal judges were “neutral” on this question, nine
percent “somewhat disagreed,” and seven percent “strongly disagreed.” In addition, seventy-six
percent of federal judges “strongly agreed” or “somewhat agreed” that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines have increased certainty in meeting the purposes of sentencing. A purpose of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines was to reduce disparities in sentencing criminal defendants.
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level. Ohio should adopt a similar form of the threshold loss amounts from the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines because the loss thresholds between felony levels in Ohio are
too great. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines specify various definitions of loss. 91 In
white-collar crimes, the loss calculation is “a critical determinant of the length of a
defendant’s sentence.”92 This loss calculation is critical because the loss is directly
correlated to the heart of the crime itself; 93 whether the offense is a form of fraud,
embezzlement,94 an international Ponzi scheme, or another white-collar crime.95
Therefore, we must compare the required loss amounts in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines to Ohio’s requirements in the Code.96

91 The USSG identify several types of loss. For example, actual loss is the “reasonably
foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense.” In addition, intended loss requires
two prongs: (1) intended loss is the pecuniary harm that the defendant purposely sought to
inflict; and (2) the intended pecuniary harm that would have been impossible or unlikely to
occur. Another form of loss, pecuniary harm, means the harm that is monetary or otherwise
readily measurable in money. Therefore, pecuniary harm “does not include emotional distress,
harm to reputation, or other non-economic harm.” Lastly, reasonably foreseeable pecuniary
harm includes the “harm that the defendant knew or, under the circumstances, reasonably should
have known, was a potential result of the offense.” United States Sentencing Commission,
Guidelines Manual, § 2B1.1, comment. 3 (2018).
92 United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Diana B. Henriques,
Madoff Is Sentenced to 150 Years for Ponzi Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2009, at A1 (stating
that [i]n 2009, Bernie Madoff was sentenced to 150 years in federal prison for conducting the
largest and most wide-spread Ponzi Scheme in history, which affected billions of dollars held
by American investors. Madoff’s imposed sentence was three times the recommended length of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.).
93 “At the heart of white collar crime is the American dream fueled by our capitalist society
wherein competition and success are key factors . . . White collar crime comes hand-in-hand
with capitalism, as corporations compete for the biggest profits and fewest losses. This ruthless
economic system encourages competitors to work harder than everybody else in order to get
ahead, which results in a sense of individualism and a lack of awareness of the problems caused
towards others.” Joseph P. Martinez, Unpublished Criminals: The Social Acceptability of White
Collar Crimes in America (Apr. 11, 2014) (unpublished thesis, Eastern Michigan University),
https://commons.emich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1381&context=honors. See generally
SOLTES, supra note 26 (discussing an empirical understanding of why white collar criminals
“commit” these offenses. Soltes interviewed multiple corporate executives that committed
financial reporting fraud, insider trading, deceptive financial structuring, and Ponzi schemes—
including the infamous Bernie Madoff.).
94 Since 2013, individuals who commit embezzlement and theft routinely comprise the
largest type of white-collar offender. They annually represent between 24.6% to 28.3% of all
economic crime offenders. Offenders that commit credit card fraud are a distant third. U.S.
Semisch, supra note 22, at 7.

Other white-collar crimes where loss is at the heart of the offense include “bank fraud,
blackmail, bribery, counterfeiting, credit card fraud, embezzlement, extortion, forgery insider
trading, insurance fraud, investment schemes, securities fraud, tax evasion, advanced fee
scams, service and repair scams, as well as Ponzi & pyramid schemes . . . .” Martinez, supra
note 93, at 5.
95

96

USSG § 2B1.1(b); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.02(B)(2) (West 2014).
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Federal Sentencing Guidelines97
Loss Amount
Increase in Offense Level
$6,500 or less
More than $6,500
More than $15,000
More than $40,000
More than $95,000
More than $150,000
More than $250,000
More than $550,000
More than $1,500,000
More than $2,500,000
More than $9,500,000
More than $25,000,000
More than $65,000,000
More than $150,000,000
More than $250,000,000
More than $550,000,000

Loss Amount

No Increase
Add 2
Add 4
Add 6
Add 8
Add 10
Add 12
Add 14
Add 1698
Add 18
Add 20
Add 22
Add 24
Add 26
Add 28
Add 30

Ohio Revised Code99
Increase in Offense Level

$1,000 – $7,499
$7,500 – $149,999
$150,000 – $749,999
$750,000 – $1,500,000
$1,500,000 & above

5th Degree Felony
4th Degree Felony
3rd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
1st Degree Felony

As demonstrated above, the required threshold loss amount for a theft felony in
Ohio is $1,000.100 Essentially, the Code provides that a defendant who stole $7,500
97 USSG § 2B1.1. This offense table applies to “larceny, embezzlement, and other forms of
theft; offenses involving stolen property; property damage or destruction; fraud and deceit;
forgery; offenses involving altered or counterfeit instruments other than counterfeit bearer
obligation of the United States.”
98

Ohio’s maximum threshold loss amount is $1,500,000. O.R.C. § 2913.02.

99

Id.

100 Alison Lawrence, Making Sense of Sentencing: State Systems and Policies 2 (National
Conference
of
State
Legislatures,
June
2015),
https://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/sentencing.pdf. Ohio is one of nineteen states, plus the
District of Columbia, to have a $1,000 state felony threshold amount. New Jersey and Virginia
have the lowest state felony threshold amount, $200, while Wisconsin has the highest state
felony threshold amount, $2,500. Ohio should consider raising its felony threshold amount so
the state can focus on sentencing the most serious offenders, rather than the low-level
offenders. Id.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss2/9

16

308

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[68:292

receives the same punishment as a defendant that stole nearly $150,000. 101 Whereas,
the federal system provides three different loss levels between this wide range. Section
2B1.1 allows intermediate thresholds at $15,000, $40,000, and $95,000 before
reaching $150,000. Hence, white-collar criminal defendants in Ohio have a
substantially higher chance of receiving a longer prison sentence due to Ohio’s large
and inappropriate organization of these threshold loss amounts. Similar to federal
sentencing ranges, smaller ranges for loss amounts in Ohio can help reduce the
sentence for a white-collar criminal defendant.
However, in 2015, the U.S. Sentencing Commission proposed numerous
amendments to Section 2B1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.102 Specifically,
one change was the new sentencing factor of “substantial financial hardship” to
victims.103 Under the original sentencing analysis, an offender received a harsher
punishment when they impacted fifty or more individuals.104 Now, the new model
allows the same sentence for the same amount of money that affects less people. 105
Therefore, an offender who embezzles or steals $1,000,000 from one person or fiftyone people can receive the same punishment.

B. Ohio Should Implement a White-Collar Sentencing Matrix Similar to
Pennsylvania’s Tailored Sentencing Matrices for Criminal Conduct
Various states had already adopted similar structures of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, even before the federal structure became a national success.106 In 1982,
Pennsylvania was the second state to draft and implement state sentencing
guidelines.107 On September 13, 2012, Pennsylvania approved the Seventh Edition of
its Sentencing Guidelines.108

101 O.R.C. § 2913.02. In Ohio, a defendant that stole nearly twenty times more than another
can receive the same punishment.
102

See Frank O. Bowman, III, Comment on Proposed Amendments to Economic Crime
Guideline, §2 B.1.1 (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendmentprocess/public-hearings-and-meetings/20150312/Bowman.pdf.
103

United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 2B1.1(b) (2018).

104

United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 2B1.1(b)(2) (2014).

105

Id. § 2B1.1(b).

106 Pennsylvania enacted the sentencing guidelines to promote uniformity and consistency
in sentencing for defendants. Jodeen M. Hobbs, Structuring Sentencing Discretion in
Pennsylvania: Are Guidelines Still a Viable Option in Light of Commonwealth v. Devers?, 69
TEMP. L. REV. 941, 960 (1996). Washington, New Jersey, and Minnesota also have similar
structures to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Daniel A. Chatham, Playing with PostBooker Fire: The Dangers of Increased Judicial Discretion in Federal White Collar
Sentencing, 32 J. CORP. L. 619, 625 (2007).
107

ROBINA INST. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIM. JUST., JURISDICTION PROFILE: PENNSYLVANIA
(2018). The Guidelines were invalidated due to a procedural error, but new guidelines became
effective in 1988.
108 Sentencing Guidelines and Implementations Manuals, PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING,
http://pcs.la.psu.edu/guidelines/sentencing/sentencing-guidelines-and-implementationmanuals (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).
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Pennsylvania’s sentencing structure incorporates three important features that can
help remedy problems the Federal Sentencing Guidelines do not address. First, the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines only apply to felonies and class A misdemeanors;
whereas Pennsylvania’s Sentencing Guidelines apply to all felonies and
misdemeanors.109 Second, Pennsylvania state judges are required to disclose in open
court the purpose and reasons of the imposed sentence for felonies and
misdemeanors.110 Third, and most importantly, Pennsylvania’s unique matrix
structure for specific criminal conduct can help remedy the sentencing disparity in
Ohio for white-collar criminal defendants.
Pennsylvania’s sentencing requirements are codified in the Pennsylvania State
Code.111 However, the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission issued an
Implementation Manual.112 This manual is similar to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Manual because it is extremely simple in assisting citizens and
practitioners to understand the consequences of criminal conduct. To determine the
guideline sentence,113 a judge in Pennsylvania must first determine the Offense
Gravity Score of the current misconduct114 and examine the defendant’s prior
record.115 Once these scores are determined, the court may apply an enhancement 116
or any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.117 Pennsylvania utilizes six different
matrices for sentencing defendants.118 For example, if an enhancement applies, then

109

204 PA. CONST. STAT. § 303.1(a) (2019).

Id. § 303.1(d). This statute states “[i]n every case in which a court of record imposes a
sentence for a felony or misdemeanor, the court shall make as a part of the record, and disclose
in open court at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence
imposed.”
110

111

See generally id. § 303.1.

112

Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, Sentencing Guidelines Implementation
Manual (7th ed. 2012).
113

204 PA. CONST. STAT. § 303.2(a).

114

Id. § 303.3; see also Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, supra note 112, at 99.
The Offense Gravity Score “measures the seriousness of the current conviction.” Similar to
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, we can analogize “Offense Gravity Score” with the
offense level.
115 204 PA. CONST. STAT. § 303.4(a). A Prior Record Score is “based on the type and number
of prior convictions . . . . and prior juvenile adjudications . . . . There are eight Prior Record
Score categories: Repeat Violent Offense (REVOC), Repeat Felony 1 and Felony 2 Offender
(RFEL), and point-based categories of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.”
116 See id. § 303.10. A court may enhance the Offense Gravity Score only under specific
circumstances. These situations include: if the offender used a deadly weapon, participated in
a criminal gang, conducted the crime at or near youth or a school, sexually abused a child,
committed third-degree murder of a victim younger than the age of 13, committed arson, or
was involved in human trafficking.
117

See id. § 303.13 for a list of aggravating or mitigating factors.

See id. §§ 303.16(a)–303.18(c). The matrix a court uses depends on the defendant’s
criminal conduct. There is a unique sentencing matrix for Offenders Under the Age of 18
Convicted of 1st or 2nd Degree Murder, Possession of a Deadly Weapon, Use of a Deadly
118
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the court uses the applicable enhancement matrix; otherwise the court applies the basic
sentencing matrix.119 The five unique matrices tailor the Offense Gravity Score and
Prior Record Score to the criminal defendant’s conduct. Hence, when a court uses a
specific matrix focused on specific criminal conduct, the defendant’s imposed
sentence is better adapted for the criminal defendant’s wrongdoing.
Ohio should adopt Pennsylvania’s form of sentencing criminal defendants using
unique matrices for specific criminal conduct. A critical reason to separate the
sentencing structure of white-collar crimes from other offenses is the inherent nature
of the crime. White-collar crimes tend to be non-violent offenses and motivated by
greed;120 whereas other crimes, such as homicide or rape, are inherently violent and
motivated by a multitude of factors. Rather than using one basic sentencing matrix, a
matrix tailored to white-collar criminal conduct would allow offenders to receive a
fairer sentence. Ohio should create and implement a white-collar matrix with the loss
threshold amounts on the vertical axis and the defendant’s prior criminal record on the
horizontal axis. This white-collar matrix would allow Ohio courts to account for the
criminal defendant’s exact loss amount and specific prior criminal record.
However, Ohio should avoid one negative aspect of Pennsylvania’s sentencing
structure—indeterminate sentencing.121 An indeterminate sentence is when a court
prescribes “a range for the minimum and maximum term”122 or a “maximum prison
term that the parole board can reduce . . . .”123 Hence, Pennsylvania judges sentence
defendants for a range of years, rather than a set term. Whereas, a determinate sentence
imposes fixed sentence durations.124 Unlike Pennsylvania, Ohio primarily utilizes a
determinate sentencing model.125 Determinate sentencing reduces judicial discretion
because the judge must sentence a criminal defendant to a specified number of years,
rather than a range of years.

Weapon, Youth Enhancement Matrix, School Enhancement Matrix, and a Youth and School
Enhancement Matrix.
119

See generally id. § 303.16(a).

120

See Pamela H. Bucy et al., Why Do They Do It?: The Motives, Mores, and Character of
White Collar Criminals, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 401, 406 (2012). Beyond greed, the top
motivations included a sense of entitlement, arrogance, competitiveness, and rationalization.
121 See Angelica L. Revelant, Indeterminate ≠ Immunity: A Review of the Pennsylvania
Sentencing Guidelines, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 187, 189 (2005).

Indeterminate Sentencing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Indeterminate
sentencing is also known as discretionary sentencing. Sentencing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019). Hence, since this Note argues that Ohio should reduce judicial discretion, Ohio
should also avoid discretionary sentencing policies.
122

123 Bradley R. Hall, Mandatory Sentencing Guidelines by Any Other Name: When
“Indeterminate Structured Sentencing” Violates Blakely v. Washington, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 643,
648 (2009).

See Lawrence, supra note 100, at 4. Determinate sentencing allows for “certainty in the
amount of time served, improve[d] proportionality of the sentence to the gravity of the offense,
and reduce[d] disparities that might exist when sentences are more indeterminate.”
124

125 Id. at 5. Along with New York and California, Ohio is one of seventeen states and the
District of Columbia to employ a determinate sentencing model. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2929.14(A) (West 2018).
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Unlike a judge’s discretionary power in Ohio, Pennsylvania’s overall sentencing
structure is highly obligatory for each judge to follow. To support this notion,
Pennsylvania scored significantly higher on the Sentencing Guideline Continuum
compared to Ohio.126 Pennsylvania received a score of nine, meaning the state’s
sentencing model is highly mandatory; whereas Ohio’s sentencing structure is
basically a voluntary decision for each judge.127 Hence, Ohio should also use
Pennsylvania as a guide for adopting a new and innovative sentencing matrix for
white-collar criminal defendants, but constrain the model to determinate sentences.

C. The Criticisms of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Will Substantially
Improve Ohio’s Sentencing Structure
Many scholars and practitioners have heavily criticized the federal government’s
structure and adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, including section
2B1.1.128 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been criticized as “rules of great
complexity and rigidity,”129 a “mechanical scoring system,”130 and, in the words of
Justice Kennedy, “unwise and unjust.”131 Although the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
are not a perfect standard, they provide a more accurate and visible model for
practitioners, citizens, and criminal defendants. Compared to Ohio’s model, the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines are visible, simple, and efficient. An important and
positive aspect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is their visibility. 132 Prior to the
federal model, sentencing guidelines for any crime were basically invisible to federal
judges, practitioners, and defendants.133 The current guidelines allow defendants
reasonable visibility and understanding of their offenses, the variations, and possible
imposed sentence. Hence, there is reduced secrecy for a defendant that
misappropriates $100,000 where his conduct falls on the sentencing table.

126 See KAUDER & OSTROM, supra note 80, at 22. This survey specifically measured how
each state’s sentencing guidelines affect judicial discretion.
127

Id. at 22; see Koenig, supra note 65. In Cleveland, Ohio, Judge Cassandra CollierWilliams stated that entering each judge’s courtroom in the Justice Center is like entering a
different city. Judge Collier-Williams stated, “[t]here’s thirty-four judges up here and it’s like
thirty-four different cities.”
128

See generally Part II of Lucian E. Dervan, Sentencing the Wolf of Wall Street: From
Leniency to Uncertainty, 61 WAYNE L. REV. 91, 107–21 (2015); Andrew Weissmann &
Joshua A. Block, White-Collar Defendants and White-Collar Crimes, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 286 (2007).
129

Robert Weisberg & Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Lessons, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1, 8 (2005).

130

Michael Tonry, The Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 37,
46 (2005).
131 Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting
(Aug. 9, 2003).
132 Michael Goldsmith & James Gibson, The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: A Surprising
Success? 15 (NYU Law Sch. Ctr. for Research in Crime & Just., Occsn’l Paper in Crime &
Just. No. 12, 1999).
133

Id.
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A supposed fault of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is that federal judges have
“been robbed” of all judicial discretion.134 However, this argument assumes that each
judge employed a rational and correct model for sentencing defendants before the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines existed.135 Although a federal judge cannot determine
a defendant’s sentence from scratch, the judge has the final decision on the defendant’s
sentence within the prescribed statutory range.136 Hence, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines have not eliminated judicial discretion. Instead, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines monitor and steer federal judges in a similar direction. Ohio judges would
immensely benefit from similar judicial discretion constraints because white-collar
criminal defendants receive vastly different sentences.
Critics also argue that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are too complex and
extensive. However, considering the Federal Sentencing Guidelines account for all
federal felony offenses and class A misdemeanors, a four-hundred-page manual is
sufficient. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are organized into eight chapters with
descriptions of each offense and specific characteristics for that offense. Each crime
has a corresponding offense level that allows federal judges to apply specific
enhancements for a particular case.137 Compared to Ohio, practitioners must locate the
criminal statute, understand the punishment prescribed in the statute, locate Ohio’s
penalties in the Code, and still leave the defendant’s sentence to the mercy of the
judge.138 Hence, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are a simple and transparent guide
for sentencing criminal defendants; whereas the sentencing structure in Ohio leaves
practitioners and defendants in the dark. Therefore, the “negative aspects” of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, when compared to Ohio’s sentencing model, actually
improve the overall purpose and function of sentencing criminal defendants.

IV. CONCLUSION
The solution to remedy the sentencing disparity for white-collar criminal
defendants in Ohio is apparent and simple: adopt the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
This successful and established national framework can help guide Ohio to implement
a clear and uniform sentencing structure. Without this vital change, judges in Ohio
retain vast discretion to determine and implement arbitrary sentences. Judicial
discretion creates disparities and bias when sentencing any criminal defendant. It is
common sense that a defendant’s conduct should determine their final punishment,
not Ohio’s flawed sentencing procedures.
134

Id. at 5.

135 See generally ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SENTENCING STUDY (1974). The authors conducted a study in the Second Circuit to determine
the sentencing disparity of federal judges. The authors discovered that before the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines were implemented, there was a wide disparity in sentencing criminal
defendants. Id. at 9. In particular, the study revealed that the judicial disparity in sentencing in
the Eastern District of New York casted “doubt on the theory that sentencing councils tend to
generate common approaches to sentencing . . . .” Id. at 23. See generally Breyer, supra note
40.
136 See id. at 19–20. A federal judge has the ability to fluctuate a defendant’s sentence using
aggravating or mitigating factors.
137

Id. at 21.

138

See id. at 27–28.
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Furthermore, Pennsylvania’s unique and effective matrices provide another tool to
remedy the sentencing disparities for white-collar criminal defendants. A matrix
tailored to white-collar crime will substantially reduce judicial discretion in Ohio and
tailor the defendant’s sentence to their criminal conduct. Although these guidelines
may not solve every problem, they will help Ohio transition in the right direction for
sentencing white-collar criminal defendants. These improvements will help Ohio
comport with the Principle of Legality, reduce judicial discretion, and minimize
unpredictability in the criminal justice system.139 The reformation of Ohio’s criminal
sentencing structure is necessary because without guidelines, Ohio judges are left with
a “difficult, soul-searching task at best.”140

139

See supra Section I.

140

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Address at Joint Sentencing Institute of the Sixth,
Seventh and Eighth Judicial Circuits 6 (Oct. 12, 1961).
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